Strategic Business Recovery Lessons from the USA and Canada

In the American context, Harvey Mansfield theorized that "the weak, formal executive" that professes solely to carry out the laws "is an aid to the strong, informal executive." He claims that the term "executive," which appears to be subservient, "connote[s] not weakness but the semblance of weakness, a presumed drawing of its own strength from that of another."  Mansfield refers to this as the "ambivalence" of the executive, in which the "pretense of 'executing' another's wishes" makes its assertions of authority more tolerable, particularly in a democratic period. However, in the Westminster system, subservience is more than just a semblance or pretense. The executive is always dependent on the legislature's overall support as well as its specific consent to legislation that advances the government's political goal. Even a government with a majority of the House, which should make keeping confidence a formality (in all meanings), must maintain the informal confidence of its party caucus in order to legislate efficiently.The executive's power is thus ambiguous in the Westminster system, but in a more practical and less secretive sense than Mansfield's. The executive cannot act beyond its tightly defined prerogative powers without the consent of the legislature, and it cannot act at all without taking into account the reaction of the legislature that keeps it in office. Parliament both empowers and subordinates the government, which means that in order to exercise power, the government must be always aware and sensitive to the interests and opinions of a diverse variety of elected and unelected individuals. A parliamentary government both follows and leads.

The administration's need to pay continual attention to party

Parliament, and public opinion calls into question the notion of the government as a parliamentary dictator, with party discipline flowing only one way, from the government to the backbenches. It also refutes the long-standing claim that the rise of parties has resulted in an executive-dominated legislature with no will, let alone power, of their own. That viewpoint focuses too much on the outcome of events rather than the process by which they occur. It assumes that because government legislation is virtually always passed, a subservient legislature is dominated by the administration. One could, however, readily draw the opposite conclusion. As Anthony McGann has put it, "if the legislature was to find an agent that perfectly implemented its wishes, then [it would look as though] the legislature was a rubber stamp." In truth, neither side dominates the other, and this true ambivalence results in a creative friction between the government and the legislature. Even with a parliamentary majority, a government must focus on its own side of the aisle. Parties are not monolithic entities, but rather coalitions of factions, and heated internal discussions among the varied members of national parties contradict their seeming public consistency. Regional and ideological divides, such as those between fiscal hawks, foreign policy doves, and the rest of the political spectrum, cause internal party disputes over specific policies or more broadly. Every member is intensely aware of his or her own re-election prospects, and a government that fails to listen to its members' anxieties

especially those in vulnerable seats where elections are won and lost

risks mutiny in the near term and electoral defeat in the long run. Divisive or unpopular policies can be avoided or moderated if enough members speak up internally, and dissatisfied members and ministers can use party discipline to their advantage behind the scenes to urge modifications to a law before it is introduced, or amendments afterward. Few ministers or prime ministers enjoy battling with their colleagues, and a developing backbench rebellion, or in extreme situations, a well-timed resignation threat, can influence policy creation by requiring a private political concession in exchange for maintaining the public impression of party unity. All of these internal factors contribute to what Brodie refers to as "[t]he informal constraints" on the prime minister's authority."A parliamentary government follows, even as it leads."Outside of parliament, the government is constantly scrutinized: indirectly through traditional media interviews, media scrums, and shouted questions; directly through town halls, public meetings with voters, and protests; and personally through the vulgar immediacy of social media. This scrutiny is facilitated by transparency legislation, which mandates the public disclosure of papers and, in some situations, private correspondence, emails, and electronic messaging from within government. 

Reports by officials and agents of Parliament who have been 

authorized to investigate the workings of government, in addition to being their own type of scrutiny, fuel scrutiny from the opposition, the media, and the general public. All of these modes of responsibility support one another. Parliamentary and extra-parliamentary scrutiny work together to influence the government's behavior or at least require it to justify its actions and decisions, especially to members of its own party, whose influence behind closed doors can generate enough private pressure to cause it to alter course publicly. More than a century ago, Sidney Low bemoaned that the rise of mass democracy meant that "for the control of Parliament, which was supposed to be regular, steady, and constant, is exchanged the control of the electorate, which is powerful, but intermittent." The truth is more intricate, and the exchange is incomplete. Despite, and possibly because of, the rise of popular democracy, the "regular, steady, and constant" political interaction between the executive and the legislature continues. The formal procedures of responsible administration, such as elections, may be sporadic, but responsive government works to keep the spirit of responsible government alive in the meantime. However, because responsive government occurs through personal contact and private pressure, it is most effective when government ministers must face their parliamentary colleagues in the eye in the government lobby and feel their censorious looks from the benches behind them in the House. Remote Parliament alleviates much of the friction between ministers and Parliament, weakening the relationship between government and the governed.